Despite nearly a decade of targeted federal government efforts to provide potable water to First Nations communities in Canada, drinking water advisories and piped-water infrastructure gaps still persist. An indepth understanding of technical practitioners' perspectives and experiences with federal policies, programs, and processes (PPP) may provide unique insight into the challenges behind the issues. To meet this objective, we interviewed 16 First Nations technical staff within the geopolitical boundary of the province of Ontario. Results emphasize the role played by federal government-centric principles that shape policy, and the inflexible nature of the program execution format. This study provides a foundation for understanding the policy translation process and indicates action areas to create supportive policy for First Nations drinking water service provision.
The First Nations technical context in Canada is jurisdictionally complex and is burdened by a colonial history. We approached this complexity through a grounded theory methodology with a focus on the 'client' perspective 4 . This focus on the client is purposeful. The voices of First Nations organizations and peoples tend to be found at the margins of the academic mainstream (Indigenous Peoples' Health Research Centre [IPHRC], 2004; McGregor, 2008) , particularly so in the technical realm. Our attempt to define this voice not only provides insight into the technical and policy challenges affecting drinking water service provision, but it also provides a much needed opening for a relatively untapped source of knowledge -the staff that fulfill technical duties for First Nations communities and organizations.
An in-depth understanding of the 'Ontario experience' through the eyes of drinking water system operators, circuit rider trainers, tribal council technical advisors, and other technical practitioners may provide a richer understanding of the complex PPPs at work in Ontario, as well as shed light on what may be occurring in other provinces and territories in Canada.
Policies, Programs, and Processes: An Overview Policies
The First Nations -Government of Canada political relationship is one of the oldest areas of Canadian government policy. The political relationship has evolved over time in response to three policy paradigm periods: the military protectionist paradigm period (first contact -1812), the assimilationist paradigm period (1812 -1990s) , and the 'new' paradigm period (1990s -present) (Howlett, 1994) . Howlett (1994) defined the new paradigm as one of mutual recognition, peaceful coexistence, and First Nations self-government. These principles became clearly established in the Canadian policy landscape through the 1996 Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples recommendations (Tanner, 2001) .
Throughout the 1990s, new paradigm policy initiatives of self-government, natural resource comanagement, and program service devolution took centre stage in the First Nations -Government of Canada political relationship. Outcomes, however, indicate that the new paradigm principles have "yet to be institutionalized in a meaningful sense" (Howlett, 1994, p. 641) . In one case, Innu Nation members experienced concerns regarding their community's capacity to administer the institutional burden of self-government (Tanner, 2001) . In another case, Kluane First Nation members perceived that the Dall sheep co-management process provided only token decision-making authority (Nadasdy, 2003) . A final case stems from a policy review of natural resource management devolution to First Nations in the Yukon Territory, which found that the process was in fact one of deconcentration, not devolution 5 (Natcher & Davis, 2007) . This dichotomy between autonomy-building initiatives and assimilationist outcomes was anticipated by Weaver (1990) . She argued that the 1990s would be a transition period in which both old and new paradigms would co-exist, producing a "continuing tension between them, as the old ways of thinking gradually give way to the new" (p. 10). 4 First Nations define their relationship with the Government of Canada as nation-to-nation. This structure is most evident in the case of land claims and self-government agreements (Malloy, 2001) . In terms of drinking water service provision, however, First Nations tend to be recipients, and thus clients, of the federally authored, administered, and 'owned' PPP. 5 Deconcentration represents a transfer of administrative responsibility to smaller, geographically dispersed government units of the same central government. In this case, it refers to an imposition of Western institutions and ideologies on First Nations governments.
In terms of drinking water service provision, federal policy was first articulated through a 1977 memorandum to Cabinet that proposed providing First Nations communities with physical infrastructure equal to that of their non-First Nations neighbours (Swain et al., 2006) . In 1984, First Nations policy in Canada gained broad legislative muscle through the Supreme Court's decision to recognize the federal government's fiduciary responsibility towards First Nations (Morse, 1989) , with drinking water service provision ostensibly falling within this responsibility (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; SDWF-AAWTT, 2009 ). Service provision devolution began in the early 1990s with day-to-day management and operation responsibilities being transferred to individual First Nations (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; Swain et al., 2006) . Policy initiatives built momentum through the 1990s and 2000s by way of a series of federal funding strategies: the Drinking Water Safety Program for Native People in 1990 (Moore, 1999) , the Gathering Strength water and sewer initiative in 1998 (OAGC, 2005) As with other new paradigm initiatives, drinking water service provision devolution has had mixed outcomes. First Nations find themselves: (i) working within a patchwork of policies, programs, and funding conditions (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; Swain et al., 2006) ; (ii) burdened by the complexity of multiple stakeholders and jurisdictional players (Swain et al., 2006) ; (iii) overwhelmed by the governance and managerial responsibilities (IOG, 2006) ; (iv) challenged by technical duties (IOG, 2006; Smith et al., 2006) ; (v) lacking a support system (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; IOG, 1999) ; (vi) lacking regulation (IOG, 2006; Swain et al., 2006); and (vii) ultimately lacking the financial resources to respond (Chiefs of Ontario, 2001; IOG, 1999; Swain et al., 2006 
Programs
The jurisdictional and operational framework that governs First Nations drinking water programs is distinct from its non-First Nation counterparts (Swain et al., 2006) . The framework is rooted in the Indian Act and is manifested as shown in Table 1 . The table shows key jurisdictional players and stakeholders, as well as their associated roles in drinking water program implementation. INAC and First Nations band councils are the dominant players within this framework; these entities are responsible for the funding and execution of drinking water service provision.
Service provision is dominated by three phases and their associated funding programs (in parentheses): system construction (Major Capital), minor system repairs and upgrades (Minor Capital), and system operation and maintenance (O&M). INAC serves as the funding agent with funding being provided through annual base funding in the form of INAC's Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program, as well as 'one-time' targeted funding strategies (e.g. First Nations Water Management Strategy) (INAC-AASB, 2009 provision. Rather, it provides funding for a range of public works, including wastewater systems, roads and bridges, community buildings, schools and power service (INAC-AASB, 2009 ).
Processes
Major Capital funding is disbursed to a First Nation through the Major Capital Works process. This process is shaped by the Treasury Board's policy for federally funded projects, specifically the Project Approval Policy (Treasury Board of Canada Secretariat, 2011). The Major Capital Works process consists of the standard sequence of engineering design and construction stages with an overlay of technical and financial review processes. The significant milestones in the review process are the Preliminary Project Approval submission (PPA) and the Effective Project Approval submission (EPA). These are 'go/no-go' INAC reviews that release funding for the subsequent design and construction stages. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the Major Capital Works process adapted from DIAND: CSDAEB (1997) and Taylor and Hill (2010) . (Taylor & Hill, 2010) . INAC is the lead action agent representing the Government of Canada. Minor Capital and Operation and Maintenance (O&M) funding is disbursed to a First Nation through funding arrangements and provided in 'block' funding format. These funds are typically transferred to First Nations on an annual basis and, therefore, are not represented in Figure 1 . Block funding provides local discretion over fund usage, provided that funding agreement requirements are met. In terms of O&M, INAC provides 80% of a formula-calculated O&M budget (INAC, 1998) .
The Case Study: The 'Ontario Experience'
Ontario is home to the largest First Nations population within a single province or territory in Canada. Twenty-three percent of the First Nations population lives in Ontario, with approximately 80,500 people living in a First Nations community 6 (DIAND, 2005 ). This population is distributed among 127 First Nations communities, 34 of which are remote (INAC, 2008b 
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communities, First Nations communities tend to have smaller populations, be more rural, and be less accessible (INAC, 2011a) .
Communities in Ontario are typically categorized according to geographic location (northern or southern) and road accessibility (accessible or remote). Generally speaking, northern Ontario has a colder climate, a bedrock geology defined by the Canadian Shield, and a low population density. In contrast, southern Ontario has a milder and shorter winter, sedimentary rock geology, and a high population density (Baldwin, Desloges, & Band, 2000; Natural Resources Canada, 2007) . All remote communities are located in northern Ontario (INAC, 2008b) .
Methods
From September to November of 2009, we conducted 13 face-to-face interviews with 16 First Nations technical practitioners from the province of Ontario. Three interviews consisted of two practitioners from the same organization being interviewed at the same time. The face-to-face interview process involved 6,000 kilometres of travel throughout Ontario. Recruitment included the snowball process and purposeful sampling 7 at a First Nations technical tradeshow.
For our study, we defined a 'First Nations technical practitioner' as a staff member of a First Nations organization that has the professional responsibility for:
• Operating or managing drinking water systems (operators or public works managers);
• Training or assisting drinking water system operators (trainers or operator association staff); • Administering or advising the implementation of drinking water system projects (tribal council technical department staff or consulting engineers of First Nation-owned engineering firms); or • Analysing drinking water system policies (policy analysts).
By nature of their professional occupation, technical practitioners have varying experiences with PPP. Project team members have direct experience in PPP execution, while operators and trainers have direct experience with PPP outcomes. Policy analysts, on the other hand, have exposure to the statistics, reports, and government publications on PPP impetus and outcomes.
Practitioner voice was diverse with professional experiences representing accessible and remote communities, small and large community populations, weak and strong economic conditions, and rural and suburban community development formats. Practitioner positions ranged from field-level to policy-level staff. Five practitioners were women and 11 practitioners voluntarily self-identified as being First Nations.
Data collection and analysis followed grounded theory methodology from Creswell (2007) and was supplemented where necessary by Marvasti (2004) . Briefly, this consisted of: (i) a semi-structured, pretested interview protocol document; (ii) a holistic and exploratory approach to data collection and analysis; (iii) verbatim transcriptions of audio-recorded interviews; (iv) transcription open coding using QSR International's NVivo 8 software; (v) preliminary coding validation through a participant feedback process; (vi) axial coding data analysis; and (vii) selective coding for meaning making. Postanalysis validation was completed through a triangulation exercise consisting of a document review of eight uncoded First Nations infrastructure case studies and media interviews. The University of Guelph Research Ethics Board approved the study. Verbal informed consent was provided by each study participant. All efforts were made to ensure confidentiality, as well as accommodate Indigenous-authored research ethics and best practices (see for example Erasmus and Ensign (1991) ; IPHRC (2004); National Aboriginal Health Organization [NAHO] , (2007); & Smith (1999) .
Results
Data analysis identified a dual central phenomenon that defines drinking water service provision PPP. This dual central phenomenon consists of a PPP paradigm and a PPP execution format.
PPP Paradigm
The first component of the central phenomenon reflects the governing principles, collectively called the PPP paradigm, that drive and control the PPP. First Nations technical practitioners' experiences with the PPP 'in action' demonstrate a persistence of three principles: financial accountability, macroand micro-control, and frugality. The following sections discuss each principle and provide a supporting table of interview-based, coded data.
Financial accountability principle. Financial accountability structures how INAC can respond to and interacts with First Nations clients, and provides limits to INAC's use of judgement and subjectivity. The overwhelming need for INAC to be accountable to external agents restricts its ability to respond to technical challenges. One participant noted:
(…) think outside the box INAC! That's one of the things I like to tell them at meetings is 'think outside the box'. They don't know how to. They can't. And their only way to defend themselves (…) is to go back to their procedures and guidelines, right? And ensure that they are being followed. (…) And that in itself in essence is the problem, right? Because stepping outside that box and trying to do something creative or better or more functional or whatever (…) is...
is virtually impossible. (P7)
A greater understanding of 'the box' that INAC must work within is provided in Table 2 . The coding breakdown shows how the financial accountability principle inhibits INAC's adaptability to the local context through an adherence to a standardized set of rules, guidelines, formulas, and criteria. At the same time, the financial accountability principle burdens the INAC -First Nations relationship with multiple levels of bureaucracy and external oversight. Figure 2 illustrates the direction of funding flow and accountability in First Nations drinking water service provision as presented in Table 2 . The figure shows a stakeholder relationship where First Nations are at the start of the accountability chain and at the end of the funding flow chain. Accountability mechanisms within a First Nation itself were not richly discussed. The various forms of macro-and micro-control, as discussed by practitioners, are presented in Cost-savings, however, are not limited to product selection decisions. It also emerges in the form of delayed spending and low design standards. Table 4 presents the findings in greater detail.
The coding breakdown alludes to a portfolio management approach to First Nations service programs. Portfolio management refers to the centralized management of one or more portfolios in order to achieve specific organizational objectives, and where success is measured in terms of aggregate performance (Project Management Institute, 2008) . This approach results in a top-down evaluation of a project's merit and an interconnectedness -and consequent vulnerability -of drinking water service provision to other service programs or portfolios (i.e. housing, health services). This approach, when pressed for funds, exhibits a 'fund stretching' phenomenon, which is characterized in the First Nations context by a penchant towards studies, piecemeal capital works approval, and bare essentials product design.
PPP Execution Format
The second half of the central phenomenon reflects PPP structure and client compatibility, characteristics collectively called the PPP execution format. Practitioners characterized the PPP format as 'one-size-fits-all' and emphasised the need for the execution format to appreciate and accommodate the diversity among First Nations communities, First Nations bands, and tribal councils. Here, we develop the premise of diversity by looking closer at three dominant themes, and by contextualizing the challenges this poses to the current PPP execution format by looking at a number of examples. The three themes investigated are capacity variations, infrastructure constructability variations, and societal diversity. Each theme is elaborated on using interview-based coded data figures or tables.
Capacity variations. In terms of drinking water infrastructure implementation and operation, capacity refers to the abilities needed to operate and maintain a water treatment plant and distribution system, and complete a Major Capital Works process. For conciseness, capacity elements are grouped into four functional categories in accordance with practitioner comments:
• Formalized capacity (e.g., education levels, engineering titles, operator certification level);
• Demonstrated capacity (e.g., credit history, project execution track record, O&M budget control); • Support systems (e.g., administrative, technical, financial management); and • Financial strength (e.g., internal sources of revenue, community economy). Infrastructure constructability variations. Infrastructure constructability variations highlight the logistical differences that affect construction projects in different parts of the province. In short, northern communities, particularly remote communities, have significantly more challenging construction logistics than their southern counterparts. Constructability variations noted by practitioners are described in Table 5 . Simply put, constructability will directly affect the cost and timeline of community infrastructure projects, translating into a sluggish rate of infrastructure development. The construction limitations experienced in remote communities should not be underestimated, as indicated by the following remark:
So the only way that they can bring in heavy material or heavy equipment is by winter road. Societal diversity. Although First Nations are lumped together as one cultural group and consequently one federal ministry, there are significant variations in societal characteristics between First Nations themselves. Practitioners indicated that remote communities, relative to road-accessible communities, have a unique social structure in terms of leadership structure, perception and adoption of formal education, and occupational priorities. In many remote communities, traditional leadership 8 is very much involved with governance decisions, including the infrastructure development processes (e.g., project meetings, project direction decisions). This is noteworthy as both the engineering consultant and construction contractor professional charge-out structures and specialization-oriented organizational structures are not equipped to deal with direct involvement from traditional leadership. As one participant commented:
And it's hard as well, for us from the technical [side]. Because we go in looking at more of the technical [aspects] and try to advise them on more of those aspects. Versus their cultural or other factors that may come into it, from TEK [traditional ecological knowledge] or others, that are unique and different than how we perceive things, from strictly trying to treat that water and making sure it's the safest (…) for consumption by the community. (P5) Societal diversity not only exists in organizational structure but also in social norms and practices. In some cases, the existing social structure in remote communities does not readily accommodate the 'nine to five' work structure. The following dialogue highlights the convergence of two distinct sets of work structure norms and practices:
P8: This fall for instance. Hunting season. One community -all the men are gone. P7: They are doing their traditional hunt. P8: For a week...You know? So who runs the water plants, the generating stations, the fuel farms and all that. There's nobody there. Everyone's gone.
Although both quotations reflect remote communities, it does not imply that non-remote First Nations communities should be grouped together as one entity. On the contrary, leadership positions on economic development and O&M user-fee systems, for example, were found to vary throughout the province with no observable trend. In the case of user-fees, some band councils and communities have accepted user-fee incorporation into their water management structure, while others view userfees negatively as a form of taxation.
Societal diversity within the First Nations cultural grouping was not pursued to great detail. The brief discussion above merely highlights how different First Nations societies express different needs, wants, and political visions through their band councils and political bodies. At a national or provincial level, these may at times appear contradictory or divided, and thus do not speak with one voice. Unto themselves, however, these may be entirely consistent.
Policies, programs, and processes compatibility examples. INAC's policies, programs, and processes are applied in an equal and standardized manner for all First Nations clients. The compatibility of this standardized approach, however, varies between First Nations communities, First Nations bands, and tribal councils. To better understand this, three PPP examples are briefly reviewed. 
.). (P8)
O&M band contribution requirement. The O&M band contribution requirement (i.e. 20% of the budget) demonstrates a general incompatibility between mandate and reality. Band contribution requirement may be theoretically feasible in communities with viable economies; however, many First Nations communities face a dire economic reality that is incompatible with the principle of user-fees. This, in turn, sets the stage for two-tier service delivery as shown in the following comment on low operator salaries:
So the rest of that money has to come from within the community itself. End-of-fiscal funding opportunity. The end-of-fiscal funding opportunity presents itself yearly between early January and March 31 st , and has the unique benefit of being streamlined with a fast turnaround. The driver behind this funding opportunity is the termination of the fiscal year. This deadline prompts federal ministries to utilize the remaining budget in preparation for the upcoming budget request. As funds must be expended by March 31 st , bands must have 'shelf-ready' designs 9 to send out for tender and construction must be completed during winter months. As such, this opportunity favours bands with the internal funds to complete a design and those located in a geographic zone that permits construction during winter. As a result, in decreasing order, this opportunity favours: southern communities, road accessible northern communities, and, lastly, remote communities. One practitioner working with remote communities emphatically remarked on this issue:
Interviewer: Is there anything you could see that would improve project implementation? That would make life easier for you?
P5: Number one would be, for my communities, to change the fiscal. That would be number one.
Remote communities' incompatibility with the end-of-fiscal opportunity is dramatic. These communities:
• Have minimal, or no, internal funds (generalized trend);
• Face a construction shutdown in winter;
• Have a restricted contractor mobilization window governed by winter road conditions; and • Require considerable leadtime for contractors to coordinate equipment mobilization on the winter roads.
Unfortunately, many special funding programs follow the same end-of-fiscal funding schedule window. As such, remote communities, and to some degree all northern communities, miss out on community infrastructure development opportunities. One practitioner spoke to this limitation: The three PPP examples provide tangible descriptions of the PPP execution format. INAC's emphasis on reproducibility and equality has resulted in a one-size-fits-all approach to program delivery, which produces PPP with incompatibilities to field conditions -a square peg, round hole phenomenon. The following quotation emphasizes the disconnect between INAC's PPP objectives and the field results:
You can work with these policies [First Nations content or employment clause in public tenders], if things work right. But for the most part, they are difficult to work with. And a lot of times First Nations will just throw up their hands and say 'ok, that is so much work to do that, let's just tender it out'. (P10)
Discussion
The three governing principles -financial accountability, macro-and micro-control, and frugalitydepict a PPP paradigm that is INAC-centric; one that places INAC's, and by association the federal government's, priorities first. This is in sharp contrast to INAC's official mandate of "[w]orking together to make Canada a better place for Aboriginal and northern people and communities" (INAC, 2011b, ¶ 1), and further still from a perceived mandate of making safe drinking water in First Nations communities a top priority. In terms of drinking water infrastructure, this disconnect is notable for two reasons. First, if INAC is not the 'champion' of First Nations infrastructure needs, then who is? And, how does this gap affect a community's physical development? Second, although federal rhetoric and funding strategies over the past decade appear to be progressive and support autonomy-building initiatives, the PPP paradigm alludes to an institution that in practice is fundamentally unchanged. Unless INAC's institutional memory and structure are dramatically changed to yield a First Nationscentric institution, federal government efforts will continue to be diluted.
The other area of concern is the PPP execution format, which is characterized as a one-size-fits-all format that stifles high capacity First Nations organizations, overwhelms low capacity organizations, and in general fails to account for the heterogeneity within First Nations. As such, rather than provide an equally beneficial operating platform, the net result is an equally unaccommodating one-size-fits-all operating platform to no one group's benefit. The take-home message is: In order to maximize PPP initiatives in Ontario, heterogeneity among First Nations must be treated as a dominant, not recessive, trait. Consequently, execution format flexibility to accommodate a diverse client base must be central to future drinking water infrastructure PPP. This is particularly critical in the context of drinking water service devolution where each First Nation band inevitably exhibits different rates of uptake and success with the devolved responsibilities.
Should the above changes not be addressed, Canada runs the risk of perpetuating the funding cycle of dismay that has been witnessed over the last decade. The government performance audit on the First Nations Water Management Strategy alludes to this possibility. The audit found "most high-risk [drinking water] systems have improved to medium-risk rather than to low-risk" (INAC, 2007, p. 92) . This statement indicates that the strategy has deflected, and not resolved, the First Nations drinking water crisis. As a starting point for change, future papers will present the practitioners' visions for a future working environment, as well as a policy tool to accommodate client diversity.
PPP Findings within the Existing Body of Knowledge
PPP findings contribute to the existing body of knowledge on First Nations and Indigenous policy as follows:
• The PPP paradigm results provide another decade of data to Howlett's (1994) study of First Nations policy change, indicating a continued failure to meaningfully implement the new paradigm in drinking water service provision; • The evident competition between new and assimilationist paradigm principles supports Weaver's (1990) prediction of a coexistence of old and new paradigms; • The non-technical factors influencing drinking water program success, such as the lack of First Nations control and the underlying institutional paradigm, corroborate Nadasdy's (2003) findings in the natural resource co-management field; • The PPP paradigm provides a lens for analysing federal government responses to First Nations issues, such as the 2010 Bill S-11 for First Nations drinking water regulation (Senate of Canada, 2010) ; and • The PPP experience in Canada provides a comparison for Indigenous policy reform taking place in other colonially structured countries. Australia, for example, has: (i) similarly abandoned its assimilationist policy paradigm in favour of a self-determination policy paradigm, (ii) not yet meaningfully implemented the new paradigm, (iii) not yet successfully devolved program services, and (iv) not yet accommodated the diversity in the Indigenous population (Sherwood & Edwards, 2006; Turner, 1997) .
Conclusion
In this article, we discussed the principles and format that govern drinking water infrastructure policies, programs, and processes in First Nations communities, and identified areas for change that otherwise may not be immediately obvious. Though findings are based on the Ontario context, the federal nature of First Nations policy may make these relevant to other provinces and territories in
